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Introduction 
In his 2002 Annual Report to Parliament the State Services Commissioner suggested that recent increases 
in the number of political advisers in ministers’ offices had ‘raised fears in some quarters about the 
potential for the politicisation of the Public Service’ (Wintringham, 2002, p. 10). Michael Wintringham 
went on to note that recent events in the United Kingdom and Australia had triggered debates regarding 
the role of political advisers, and the bearing their activities have on relations within the executive branch. 
 
This article contains a preliminary exploration of some of the roles, relationships and accountabilities of 
ministerial advisers in New Zealand. It also reviews equivalent arrangements in Australia and the United 
Kingdom where, partly as a result of controversial events such as the so-called ‘Moore/Sixsmith’ and 
‘children overboard’ affairs, there has been rather more debate around the use and regulation of advisers 
than there has been in New Zealand.  Such lessons as may be discerned, however, are at this stage 
tentative in the extreme. Our principal purpose at this point is to establish the groundwork for further 
research directed at the contribution of what is now routinely referred to in the United Kingdom as the 
‘third element’ of the executive branch (Wicks, 2002a, p. 3).  
 
Special advisers in the United Kingdom 
Special advisers have been a feature of the executive environment in the United Kingdom (UK) since the 
time of Lloyd George. But since 1997, as a result of Labour’s desire to strengthen the centre of 
government the number of those once described by Wilson as ‘an extra pair of hands, ears and eyes and a 
mind more politically aware than would be available to a Minister from political neutrals’ (Wilson, 1976, 
p. 5; cited in Wicks, 2002a, p. 6) has climbed appreciably. In 1996 there were 38 special advisers, but in 
2002 ministers employed some 83 advisers (27 of whom worked in one or other of the specialist units 
within the Prime Minister’s office at No. 10). Of that number, 11 are employed principally in a 
communications capacity, 30 or so deal largely with speech-writing, and the remainder engage in various 
policy-related activities (Wilson, 2002, p. 387). 
 
Special advisers are employed under the 1995 Civil Service Order in Council as temporary civil servants 
within departments. However, there is a core difference between career civil servants and special 
advisers: while the former are expected to adhere to the civil service conventions of neutrality and 
objectivity, the latter are appointed by ministers to provide an expressly partisan ‘‘voice’ within a 
department’ (Neill, 2000, p. 68). In general terms, the role of advisers is to contribute ‘a political 
dimension to the advice available to Ministers ... while reinforcing the political impartiality of the 
permanent Civil Service by distinguishing the source of political advice and support’ (Ministerial Code, 
para. 50). Amongst other activities, advisers review policy proposals from the point of view of the 
governing party, manage the political risks associated with policy development and implementation, 
prepare speculative policy papers reflecting the preferences of the minister’s party, and brief party 
members (both MPs and officials) on issues of government policy. 
 
The parameters within which special advisers operate are established in various documents. 
  
Advisers sign a Model Contract for Special Advisers. Employment contracts are between advisers and 
departments, although the appointing authority is the relevant minister. The contract specifies those parts 
of the Civil Service Code of Conduct which apply to advisers (see below), but recognises the particular 
character of the advisers’ role by removing the requirement that appointment be on the basis of an open, 
competitive process, and by specifying that the period of appointment ends with the demise of the 
government, or with the departure of the appointing minister.  
 
With the exception of those provisions regarding the duty to act impartially and objectively, special 
advisers must adhere to the Civil Service Code of Conduct (CSCC). Should special advisers offend 
against the code, any subsequent disciplinary action is the responsibility of the relevant permanent head of 
department. 
 
In addition, special advisers are subject to a Code of Conduct for Special Advisers (CCSA). Between 
1997-2001 advisers were governed by the contents of the Ministerial Code and the CSCC, but following 
the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (Neill, 2000) and the Public 
Administration select committee (House of Commons, 2001a) the government implemented a dedicated 
code for advisers in 2001. The CCSA clarifies that advisers are ‘employed to help Ministers on matters 
where the work of Government and the work of the Government Party overlap and it would be 
inappropriate for permanent civil servants to become involved’, and exempts advisers from the 
requirement to act impartially and objectively. It specifies the tasks advisers may be required to 
undertake, imposes a duty on all advisers to respect the impartiality of career civil servants (and contains 
procedures for civil servants who wish to raise matters regarding the conduct of advisers), and clarifies 
the respective roles of advisers and departmental information staff vis a vis contact with the media. 
 
It is widely accepted that special advisers are an important adjunct of executive government: indeed. Sir 
Richard Wilson, a former head of the Civil Service, is not alone in maintaining that advisers are ‘now 
established as a proper and legitimate feature of the constitutional framework within which Cabinet 
ministers work’, and that their value lies in being able to ‘help the department understand the mind of the 
minister, work alongside officials on the minister’s behalf and handle party political aspects of 
government business’ (Wilson, 2002, p. 387).  
 
The ‘Moore/Sixsmith’ affair – which was triggered by feuding between advisers and officials, and which 
resulted in the resignation of minister and the dismantling of a department - threw a number of important 
issues into sharp relief (see House of Commons, 2002). In particular, it highlighted concerns that the 
growing influence of special advisers may (if it has not already done so) politicise the policy process by 
diminishing the role of civil servants (Neill, 2000, p. 73; Mountfield, 2002). The issue is not so much that 
advisers pressure civil servants to act in an overtly partisan manner, it is that at some point senior civil 
servants’ contribution to policy formation and their access to ministers may be compromised by 
gatekeeping on the part of advisers, resulting in the ‘marginalisation of orthodox civil service advice’ 
(Mountfield, 2002, p. 3).  
 
There is a view that this risk is overstated, and that the 3,700 or so members of the senior civil service are 
in no immediate danger of being overrun by a relatively small cadré of special advisers (Wilson, 2002). 
But the ratio of advisers to officials is arguably less important than the leverage which advisers exert at 
the heart of the executive, and the privileged access they have to ministers (House of Commons, 2001a; 
Wicks, 2002b). Thus, there is some disquiet regarding the potential for advisers to assume executive 
authority which is conventionally the prerogative of ministers.  
 
The dual system of control which applies to special advisers contributes to the fuzziness around roles and 
relationships. Briefly, because an adviser is personally appointed by a minister (with the permission of the 
Prime Minister), but is also subject to the control of a permanent secretary, the ‘lines of accountability 
and ownership can appear less than clear’ (Neill, 2000, p. 73). When relations between special advisers 
and permanent officials are cordial, and when advisers refrain from trying to influence management or 
operational activities, this contradiction remains latent (House of Commons, 2002). However, when 
boundaries are transgressed (by advisers or civil servants), permanent heads of department may find 
themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to discipline, and perhaps fire, an adviser who has 
been appointed by a minister.  
 
Looking ahead in the United Kingdom 
While there is unease in some quarters with the increase in the number and influence of special advisers, 
there is no sense of systemic crisis in the UK. That said, the Moore/Sixsmith affair gave additional 
impetus to the pressure to clarify existing arrangements by extending Parliament’s oversight of special 
advisers. Based on the principle that because advisers ‘are paid out of public funds ... there must be 
accountability for [advisers] to Parliament’ (Wicks 2002a, p. 14), there is now a measure of support for 
statutory regulation, either in the form of specific legislation for special advisers (as exists in Ireland) or 
via a comprehensive Civil Service Act (House of Commons, 2002; Mountfield, 2002; Neill, 2000; Wicks, 
2002a).  
 
Proponents of a Civil Service Act (to which the Blair government has committed) argue that legislation 
would substantially reduce the ambiguities in the current system, and address the seeming 
unenforceability of the existing non-statutory instruments (House of Commons, 2002). Future legislation 
will likely seek to clarify accountability arrangements by incorporating the codes of conduct for both civil 
servants and special advisers. There is a measure of support for granting Parliament the right to establish 
the total number of advisers at the start of each parliamentary term, with any subsequent increase 
requiring affirmative resolutions in both Houses (Grice, 2002b; Neill, 2000; Wicks, 2002a; Wilson, 
2002). 
 
Another view disputes the merits of statutory limits, and proposes instead that, much as opposition parties 
currently receive ‘Short Money’ for the purposes of funding their parliamentary business, a specific 
appropriation could be made for special advisers (which would place an outer limit on the overall number 
of advisers but ensure ministers had some flexibility in their appointment and deployment) (House of 
Commons, 2001a, para. 30). The government has accepted the case of limiting the number of advisers via 
legislation (House of Commons, 2001b), but has expressed concerns that advisers’ access to civil 
servants, and to advice generated by officials, would be unhelpfully constrained if advisers were 
constituted under a discrete category (UK Government, 2002). 
 
There are various other ways in which the boundaries between ministers, special advisers and civil 
servants might be clarified. For instance, attention has also been drawn to the need to rectify the anomaly 
between the 1995 Order in Council, which describes the adviser’s role as ‘giving advice only to 
Ministers’, and the provisions of the special advisers’ code, which permit advisers to brief the media 
(House of Commons, 2002). A case for better induction and training, both for civil servants and special 
advisers, has been made, as has the argument for a more effective grievance procedure for officials who 
feel their impartiality has been compromised by the actions of advisers (House of Commons, 2002; 
Wilson, 2002). In the interests of providing some assurance regarding the calibre of advisers paid from 
the public purse, it has also been recommended that special adviser posts be publicly advertised (as does 
the First Minister in Wales), with the final choice of appropriately qualified candidates resting with 
ministers (House of Commons, 2001a). 
 
Ministerial Advisers within the Australian Federal Government 
The roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of advisers have also been topical matters in Australia, 
particularly in the period since the last Federal election and in the light of what has become known as the 
‘children overboard’ affair, or a ‘certain maritime incident’. The ‘incident’, centred in large part on the 
actions of ‘political’ staff in the Office of the Minister of Defence, Peter Reith. Prior to the November 
2001 Federal election these staff released photographs of asylum seekers that purported to show them 
children being thrown into the sea as a protest against, or in an attempt to frustrate, being taken into 
custody by members of the Australian Defence Force. Subsequent inquiries indicated that the photographs 
were taken when the vessel carrying the asylum seekers sank, and that the Minister’s staff were advised of 
this prior to the release of the photographs. 
 
In 1972 the Whitlam Government introduced a ‘new style of Ministerial office’, with the employment of 
partisan advisers recruited from outside of the APS (Maley, 2002, p. 103). That Government’s Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA, or the Coombs Commission) identified 
the importance of this change of style, and in 1974 the administration signalled its intention to explore a 
number of issues in relation to ministerial (i.e. non-APS) staff, including: 
•   the need to define their roles and those of departments, to avoid misunderstanding, overlap and 
‘clash’; 
•   the relationship of ministerial staff to those in departments and statutory and other bodies; 
the possibility of establishing closer and better understood links between staffs of different ministers; 
the use of ministerial staff members in working groups which include departmental and/or outside 
members (RCAGA, 1979, p. 9; cited in Maley, 2002, p. 103). 
 
The Report of the Royal Commission, while acknowledging a role for the ministerial office in 
communicating with stakeholders, was far more cautious on the matter of an explicit role for the office in 
the policy process. Indeed, the Commission: 
 
... did not generally favour policy advisers in ministers’ offices. The report recommends that 
where a minister feels the need for additional policy advice and analysis, ‘it is preferable that 
he should take up these needs with his departmental head’ as ‘it will frequently be more 
helpful for him if the resources of the department are more effectively mobilised or 
stimulated to be responsive to his needs’ (Maley 2002, p. 104). 
 
The period of the Fraser Government saw a reduction in the number of ministerial advisers, but a 
significant increase in the resourcing of the Prime Minister’s office, including by way of the employment 
of partisan advisers. 
 
The election of the Hawke Government in 1983 presaged a significant increase in the number of 
ministerial advisers, an increase underpinned by an explicit policy commitment to bring a ‘political 
dimension’ to the process of policy development. Following the election of the Hawke Government, a 
Statement on Reforming the Public Service asserted that ‘Ministerial control will be bolstered only if 
large numbers of politically committed people can have a close involvement in the development and 
implementation of policy’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 1983; cited in Maley, 2002, p. 105). 
 
Indeed the partisan policy role that had been so controversial and fiercely resisted in the Whitlam period 
was both asserted and legitimised from the outset of the Hawke Labor period (Maley, 2002, p. 105). 
During the Hawke/Keating governments there was a 63% increase in the number of ministerial advisers 
(and the numbers have continued to grow steadily under the Howard Coalition Government) (Maley, 
2000a). Maley’s research reveals that around half of the ministerial advisers in those governments were 
public servants on secondment, and that 70% had a career background in the public service. 
 
Interestingly, the fact that the role of ministerial adviser is quite explicitly a partisan one does not militate 
against ministerial advisers being recruited from, and returning to the public service. As Maley notes: 
 
A partisan public servant is a definitional impossibility in Britain, where public servants 
simply cannot work as ‘special advisers’. Yet in Australia it is accepted with little debate that 
each year many public servants go to work in clearly partisan roles in ministers’ office and 
then return to work in the public service (2002, p. 106). 
 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard has suggested that one of the fundamentals of the Australian 
democratic process is ‘[a]n accountable, non-partisan and professional public service providing to a 
democratically elected government sound and fearless advice … and … preserving its value is a priority 
for my government’ (Howard, 2001). In the same address, however, he goes on to say, in relation to 
contestability of advice: 
 
Ministers can and do, of course, employ public servants in their private offices. It’s 
appropriate that ministerial offices draw from the full range of skills – political and public 
administrative – that’s available. And it’s a tribute to the quality of training and range of 
experience offered within the APS that some of the finest Ministerial staff I have known had 
previous careers within the service. … In many ways, it’s the ideal – someone who 
understands the detailed workings of government but who is fully attuned and sympathetic to 
the Government’s political and policy objectives (Howard, 2001, emphasis added). 
 
Ministerial advisers now have a clear policy focus to their work, and see themselves as ‘partisan policy 
advisers’ (Maley, 2002, p. 106). And while most ministerial advisers work in the role for a relatively short 
period of time, a significant minority have worked for previous governments (Federal and/or State), 
and/or have moved in and out of adviser roles over a long period. Increasingly, the role of the ministerial 
adviser is that of the ‘technical’ policy specialist, with approximately half of the advisers included in 
Maley’s study of the Keating Government defined as specialists, with a deep knowledge of policy issues 
(Maley, 2002, p. 106). 
 
The Report of the Senate Committee into a ‘certain maritime incident’ released on 23 October 2002, 
found that ‘there is a serious accountability vacuum at the level of ministers’ offices arising from the 
change in roles and responsibilities of, and the kinds of interventions engaged in by, ministerial advisers’ 
(2002, p. xi). It went on to recommend that: 
 
... the Australian Public Service Commission convene a Working Group of senior officials of 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and senior parliamentary offices of both 
Houses of Parliament, to develop a Code of Conduct for ministerial advisers incorporating a 
Statement of Values commensurate with Conduct and Values provisions that apply within the 
Australian Public Service. The report should also make any recommendations concerning 
mechanisms for dealing with any breaches of such a Code, or the handling of complaints 
arising from the actions of ministerial advisers (2002, p. xl). 
 
Others have also suggested a regulatory approach to the issue. Holland, for example (echoing similar calls 
in the UK), has raised the possibility of ministerial staff being subject to the requirement to appear before 
Parliamentary committees, the insertion of conduct-related clauses in legislation, greater transparency of 
ministerial staff contracts, parliamentary regulation of numbers of and/or the conditions of employment of 
ministerial staff, and the establishment of a complaints review process beyond merely review by the 
Prime Minister (Holland, 2002). 
 
On the other hand, there are those who maintain that the issue is systemic in nature, and that the remedy, 
in part at least, is a cultural one. For instance, John Uhr has observed that: 
 
Official conduct will not improve until we as a political community have some common 
agreement on publicly credible specifications of role: for ministers, their staff and for other 
discretionary decision-makers. Knowing the responsibility of role means more than reciting 
provisions of public service legislation. It means knowing the public value of the 
responsibilities under one’s care, and being prepared to account publicly for one’s 
performance in realising that role (Uhr, 2002). 
 
4 Ministerial Advisers in New Zealand 
Events (and subsequent debates) in the UK and Australia provide a backdrop against which to consider 
the question of political advisers in New Zealand. 
 
4.1 how many advisers? 
Notwithstanding a tendency for some commentators to do so (Venter, 2002; Young, 2002), the trend 
towards larger ministerial offices cannot be attributed solely to an increase in the number of political 
advisers. The Ministerial Services Branch of the Departmental of Internal Affairs employs ministerial 
staff in a variety of capacities, and  ministers also draw on the services officials seconded from 
government departments. Party Leaders, including leaders of the party or parties formally constituting the 
government at any given time, also have access to staff funded and employed by the Parliamentary 
Service. Indeed, it is difficult to establish precisely how many ministerial advisers there are. There is no 
formal cap on the overall number of advisers, and oversight of their appointment and deployment rests 
with the Prime Minister, as Minister responsible for Ministerial Services. That said, so far as staff 
employed within ministers’ offices are concerned, it is possible to distinguish between those employed by 
Ministerial Services on an events-based basis, secondees from departments, and individuals working on 
specific, project-based contracts. 
 
Ministerial advisers are employed on events-based contracts, whereas secondees, who are typically 
‘private secretaries’ (DLOs in the Australian context), are employed to provide administrative support and 
liaison rather than partisan advice. While there has been a marked jump in the total number of staff 
employed in the executive in recent years, the number of ministerial (partisan) advisers is necessarily 
smaller than the number of ministerial staff. 
 
Table 1: Events-based contact staff employed by the DIA (2003) 
 
DesignationNumberSenior Private Secretary23Ministerial Adviser/Senior Adviser22Executive 
Assistant8Press Secretary/Media Assistant21total74 
The clearest means of establishing the number of advisers is to disaggregate the number of staff employed 
on events-based contracts by functional classification (see Table 1). Even that delineation is not entirely 
satisfactory, as some secondees are also remunerated (in part or whole) by Ministerial Services. However, 
by teasing out the functions performed by events-based contract staff it is possible to roughly distinguish 
between administrative tasks and political/advisory activities. Senior Private Secretaries tend to provide 
administrative rather than political support, and generally manage the ministerial office as an 
administrative entity. While the line of demarcation between the administrative and the political is, at 
best, indistinct, Advisers/Senior Advisers, Executive Assistants, and Press/Media staff tend to engage in 
more explicitly political functions. On that basis, it is reasonable to conclude that the presence of 
ministerial/political advisers is considerably smaller than might be inferred from the general trends 
towards larger ministerial offices. 
 
4.2 regulating advisers 
 
In a formal sense, the regulation of ministerial advisers is established largely through: 
An employment contract. The authority to appoint ministerial advisers under the State Sector Act 1988 
rests with Ministerial Services (James, 2002). 
 
A job profile which is signed as part of the terms and conditions of employment, and which specifies the 
mix of tasks for which an adviser is accountable. 
 
The Public Service Code of Conduct (PSCC). Section 57 of the State Sector Act 1988 enables the State 
Services Commission to establish minimum standards of integrity and conduct to which all 
employees of government departments are expected to adhere. The current code (revised in 
September 2001) establishes three principles of conduct. As employees of the DIA, ministerial 
advisers must (a) fulfil their lawful obligation to government with professionalism and integrity, (b) 
perform their official duties honestly, faithfully and efficiently, respecting the rights of the public 
and colleagues, and (c) not bring the public service into disrepute through their private activities. 
 
In addition, advisers are subject to the DIA’s own Code of Conduct (which modifies the core provisions 
of the PSSC to the department’s specific circumstances). What is of particular note is that the code 
requires the department’s employees to ‘[e]nsure that their personal interests or convictions do not 
interfere with the duty to serve the Minister through the Secretary of Internal Affairs’, and, under a 
separate section headed ‘Political Neutrality’, to ‘provide honest and impartial advice to Ministers 
and faithfully implement the policies of the Government of the day’ (emphasis added). 
 
4.3 looking ahead 
 
With the advent of mixed-member proportional representation the environment within which ministers, 
officials and ministerial advisers function has become more complex. 
 
It is in this more exacting context that the issues raised by the State Services Commissioner in his 2002 
Annual Report, and with which this paper began, should properly be considered. Following his 
observations on the concerns regarding politicisation, Michael Wintringham went on to note that: 
 
For the Public Service to work effectively with ministerial advisors (and vice versa) clear 
understandings or protocols are needed between Ministers and their chief executives 
(Wintringham, 2002, p. 12). 
 
On the basis of both evidence and experience we would support the Commissioner’s call for 
‘understandings or protocols’ between ministers and their Chief Executives. The reality is that many 
ministers and chief executives already operate on the basis of an informal understanding as to the 
respective roles of departmental officials and ministerial advisers. Indeed, observation and experience 
would suggest that it is nigh on impossible for a ministerial adviser to operate effectively without having 
‘negotiated’ understandings with his/her departmental colleagues, both within the ministerial office, and 
the department or agency. 
 
However, from time to time tensions do arise between ministerial advisers and their departmental 
colleagues (as they do between public servants, both within and between departments). Given that no 
such concerns have yet surfaced publicly, it may be that the very ‘understandings or protocols’ which 
Michael Wintringham commends to ministers and Chief Executives are already in place, in various 
informal manifestations, and are working effectively. That said, if ministerial advisers have become 
(either de facto or de jure) a third branch of the executive, thought should be given to the formal 
framework within which their contribution to government processes might best be made. 
 
The accountability arrangements which apply to advisers in New Zealand are rather less clear than those 
which exist elsewhere, especially in the UK. A particular anomaly arises out of the fact that advisers are 
subject to codes of conduct which enjoin them to act impartially, objectively and anonymously. As is 
recognised in the UK (House of Commons, 2001a, p. 3) and accepted within the Australian jurisdiction, 
ministerial advisers are a special type of public servant, and it seems nonsensical to hold them to account 
(or at least for that possibility to technically exist) against standards which proscribe the very activities 
they are employed to undertake. Along with the absence of a domestic equivalent of the UK’s Model 
Contract and a dedicated code for advisers, this simply contributes to the lack of clarity regarding the 
accountability arrangements which do apply to ministerial advisers here. 
 
Thus far in New Zealand there have been no events to rival those which have transpired in Australia and 
the UK. However, the imprecision of the existing accountability régime is such that disputes involving 
ministerial advisers are likely to occur (although the degree to which these become public is another 
matter). Future attempts to clarify advisers’ accountability would ideally strike a balance between the 
public’s interest in the public resourcing and activities of advisers with ministers’ legitimate demands for 
political advice.  
 
An obvious initiative in this direction would be the development and publication of a Code of Conduct for 
Ministerial Advisers (CCMA). Drawing on the comparative experience, such a code could usefully clarify 
the distinction between advisers and permanent officials by explicitly recognising the partisan nature of 
the adviser’s role. A CCMA should also specify other appropriate standards against which advisers’ 
behaviour could be assessed by clarifying which provisions of the Public Service and DIA codes of 
conduct also apply to advisers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
The principal purposes of this article have been to explore the emergence of ministerial advisers in New 
Zealand and, drawing on the comparative experiences of two nations with which New Zealand enjoys 
both some constitutional and political affinity, to suggest an agenda for future research. There are several 
important issues which we have not attempted to explore in any detail here, amongst which are the 
contribution ministerial advisers make to policy development, and the relationship between ministers’ 
press staff, departments and the media. 
 
In terms of a research strategy going forward – one that might provide an evidence base for 
policy-making in respect of a regulatory régime (should that be deemed necessary) – it will be vital to 
engage with ministerial advisers, senior officials (and in particular Chief Executives), and ministers.  
 
At some point in the future, questions regarding the roles, relationships and accountabilities of ministerial 
advisers will arise publicly. The comparative experiences reviewed here provide a menu of institutional 
remedies, extending from codes of conduct to parliamentary oversight of the numbers and activities of 
advisers. However, those experiences also suggest that there will be instances in which a rules-based 
régime may be insufficient: formal accountability arrangements notwithstanding, failures occur. Perhaps, 
as Uhr suggests, the issue is one for the whole political and policy community to reflect on, with the 
objective being the development and sustenance of a culture in which discretion and an internalised sense 
of responsibility is appropriately exercised, and in which a shared sense of ‘publicness’ acts as a check on 
partisan excesses. Whatever the way forward, one lesson to be learned is that it is prudent to erect the 
appropriate arrangements before, rather than after, unfortunate events occur. 
 
References 
 
Academic 
Benson, L. D., 1990. Political advisers: a bibliography. Monticello, Illinois. 
Boston, J., Levine, S., McLeay, E., and Roberts, N. S., 1996. New Zealand under MMP: A New Politics? 
Auckland, Auckland University Press with Bridget Williams Books. 
Code of Conduct for Special Advisers (UK) (www.cabinet-office.gov.uk). 
Edwards, M., 2002. ‘Ministerial Advisers and the Search for Accountability’, Canberra Bulletin of Public 
Administration, no. 105, pp. 16-19. 
Henderson, J., 2001. ‘Prime Minister’, in Miller, R. (ed.) New Zealand Government and Politics. (2nd 
ed.) Auckland, Oxford University Press. 
Hennessey, P., 2000. Oral evidence to Neill, P., 2000. Reinforcing Standards. Sixth Report of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (www.public-standards.gov.uk). 
Holland, I., 2002. Accountability of Ministerial Staff? Australian Commonwealth Parliamentary Library 
Research Paper, no. 19. 
House of Commons (UK), 2001a. Special Advisers: Boon or Bane? Fourth Report of the Select 
Committee on Public Administration (HC 293, session 2000/01). 
House of Commons (UK), 2001b. Special Advisers: Boon or Bane? The Government Response to the 
Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2000-01. Third Report of the Select Committee on Public 
Administration (HC 293, session 2001/02). 
House of Commons (UK), 2002. ‘These Unfortunate Events’: Lessons of Recent Events at the Former 
DTLR. Eighth Report of the Select Committee on Public Administration (HC 303, session 
2001/02). 
House of Representatives (NZ), 1999. Standing Orders. 
Howard, J., 1997. The Sir Robert Garran Oration. Address to the National Conference of the Institute of 
Public Administration, 19 November 1997 (www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/1997). 
Howard, J., 2001. Centenary of the APS Oration. Address to the Centenary Conference of the Institute of 
Public Administration, 19 June 2001 (www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/2001). 
James, C., 2002. The tie that binds: The relationship between ministers and chief executives. Wellington, 
Institute of Policy Studies and the New Zealand Centre for Public Law. 
King, Simon, 2003, Regulating the Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Civil Servants, The 
Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London 
McGee, D., 1994. Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand. (2nd. ed.) Wellington, GP Publications. 
McLeay, E., 1995. The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand. Auckland, Oxford University Press. 
Maley, M., 2000a. ‘Conceptualising Advisers’ Policy Work: The Distinctive Policy Roles of Ministerial 
Advisers in the Keating Government, 1991-1996’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 35, 
no. 3, pp. 449-470. 
Maley, M., 2000b. ‘Too Many or Too Few? The Increase in Federal Ministerial Advisers 1972-1999’, 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 48-53. 
Maley, M., 2002. ‘Australian Ministerial Advisers and the Royal Commission on Government 
Administration’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 103-107. 
Martin, J., 2002. ‘Integrity and Public Administration’, IPS Newsletter, no. 69, pp. 14-19. 
Ministerial Code (UK) (www.cabinet-office.gov.uk). 
Neill, P., 2000. Reinforcing Standards. Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
(www.public-standards.gov.uk). 
Nolan, 1995. The First Report. First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
(www.public-standards.gov.uk). 
Odgers, S. J., 2002. Report of Independent Assessor to Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime 
Incident, 21 August 2002. 
Responses to Government Administration Committee: Vote Ministerial Services. Memo from the New 
Zealand Prime Minister, Minister Responsible for Ministerial Services. Received by the Committee 
on 1.10.02. 
Roberts, J. L., 1987. Politicians, Public Servants and Public Enterprise. Wellington, Institute of Policy 
Studies. 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, 1977. Report of the Royal Commission on 
Australian Government Administration. AGPS, Canberra. 
Scott, G., 2001. Public Management in New Zealand. Lessons and Challenges. Wellington, New Zealand 
Business Roundtable. 
Senate of Australia, 2002. Report of A Senate Select Committee into A Certain Maritime Incident, 23 
October 2002. 
Shaw, R., 2001. ‘Consultants and Advisers’, in Miller, R. (ed.) New Zealand Government and Politics. 
Auckland, Oxford University Press. 
State Services Commission, 1995. Working Under Proportional Representation: A Reference for the 
Public Service. Wellington, State Services Commission. 
United Kingdom Government, 2002. Submission to Inquiry of the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
- Defining the Boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the Civil Service 
(www.public-standards.gov.uk). 
Wilson, R., 2002. ‘Portrait of a profession revisited’, Political Quarterly, vol. 73, no. 4, pp. 381-391. 
Wicks, N., 2002a. Defining the Boundaries within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
permanent Civil Service. Issues and Questions Paper prepared by the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life (www.public-standards.gov.uk). 
Wicks, N., 2002b. Transcript of press launch of Issues and Questions consultation paper on Boundaries 
within the Executive: Ministers, Special Advisers and permanent Civil Servants (). 
Wicks, N., 2003. Defining the boundaries within the exective: Ministers, Special Advisers and the 
permanent Civil Service. Ninth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
(www.public-standards.gov.uk). 
Wilson, H., 1976. The Governance of Britain. London, Weidenfield and Nicholson and Michael Joseph. 
Wintringham, M., 2002. Annual Report of the State Services Commissioner, Wellington, State Services 
Commission. 
 
 
MASSEY UNIVERSITY
MASSEY RESEARCH ONLINE http://mro.massey.ac.nz/
Massey Documents by Type Journal Articles
A third force?: Ministerial advisers in the Executive
Eichbaum, C
2003
http://hdl.handle.net/10179/9771
20/01/2020 - Downloaded from MASSEY RESEARCH ONLINE
